After the success of the April revolution a quarrel began between the different wings of the MNR about sharing out the quotas of power. When Lechí n withdrew, protesting at the few posts given to him for his followers, the leader of the right-wing gave way. According to Lechí n's story, Siles followed him as far as the palace staircase: `Juan, come back and we will talk. Put your points of view, and so that they can be carried out, name four ministers'. Lechí n went back, named four minsters almost at random, and thus co-government was born".(30) (ibid. p.301).
"The top layer of the left-wing supported by some union leaders, were content to impose two worker ministers and three centrists in the cabinet and to challenging the right to posts and positions in the administrative bureaucracy".(31) (Boletin Interno, No 13, of the POR, undated, p.8). As far as the POR was concerned Lechí n should have fought for more portfolios and perhaps some for the POR.
Supported by all the POR votes the newly born COB resolved "To grant comrades Juan Lechí n and Germá n Butró n the absolute confidence of the working class and to reaffirm its solidarity and support in the ministerial posts they hold at present".(32) (Movimiento obrero y procesos politicos en Bolivia: Historia de la COB 1952-1987 Jorge Lazarte, EDOBOL, La Paz, 1989, p.280).
The POR, after identifying itself with the Lechí nist ministers, did ask them to resign in protest about the delay in nationalising the mines. But, on other occasions, later, the POR was once more to demand the capture of ministries on behalf of Lechí nism.
In July, the POR said: "When the COB was organised the situation of the worker ministers in the cabinet was defined as spokesmen of the working class in the government and agents of the government in the workers' camp. The action of the workers ministers, as a minority, is difficult. Faced with that fact, there was undoubtedly no other alternative but to resign".(33) (LO, 15.7.52, p.1).
In November, the POR issued a `self-criticism': "In spite of all their bold statements, these workers representatives, instead of proletarianising the cabinet as had been proposed, only succeeded in ministerialising the Central Obrera Boliviana".(34) (LO, 29.11.52, p.2)
Towards the end of 1953, the POR leadership presented a Report in which it stated that: "The new upsurge comes from the demand to Lechí n to leave the cabinet put forward by the mining unions, backed by the COB and curbed by Lechí n. Our union fraction then took up a neutral and vacillating position". "We have no doubt that this new period of upsurge will culminate with the adoption of our political theses".(35) (Boletin Interno, No 13, POR, p.11).
The POR admitted that its trade unionists adapted to the pressures from Lechí n. The policy of demanding the resignation of the labour ministers was an opportunist manoeuvre. It did not accompany the call for the COB to take power. Some weeks later, during the key events which frustrated the rightist January coup, the POR was to demand that `the comrade President' Bolivianise his government and allow them to join it. For those reasons, the `new period of upsurge' did not end with the victory of the POR theses but in the victory of the MNR, which was to succeed by absorbing most of the membership and periphery of the POR.
Previous Chapter : The POR Supports The Bourgeois Government
Next Chapter : The POR Seeks To Enter The Bourgeois Government
Return to Welcome page
Return to unpublished documents list
Return to Bolivia documents list
Return to chapter list for José Villa on Bolivia